Wage effects of R&amp;D tax incentives: evidence from the Netherlands by Lokshin, B. & Mohnen, P.
  
 
Wage effects of R&D tax incentives: evidence from the
Netherlands
Citation for published version (APA):
Lokshin, B., & Mohnen, P. (2008). Wage effects of R&D tax incentives: evidence from the Netherlands.
(UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series; No. 034). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social
Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2008
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#2008-034 
Wage effects of R&D tax incentives: 
Evidence from the Netherlands 
 
Boris Lokshin and Pierre Mohnen 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology 
 Keizer Karelplein 19,  6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, e-mail: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Wage effects of R&D tax incentives:  
Evidence from the Netherlands 
 
Boris Lokshin1, 2 and Pierre Mohnen1, 2, 3 
 
1Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands 
2UNU-MERIT, Maastricht, The Netherlands 
3CIRANO 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the Dutch R&D tax incentives program, known as WBSO, on the 
wages of R&D workers. In our model these wages are partly determined by the government’s WBSO tax 
disbursements. We construct detailed firm- and time specific R&D tax credit rates as a function of the 
R&D tax incentives scheme to capture the wage effects of the government R&D support. An instrumental-
variables econometric model is estimated using an unbalanced firm-level panel data covering the period 
1996-2004. After controlling for firm and industry effects and business cycle fluctuations, R&D tax 
incentives are found to increase R&D wages. The R&D wage effect of these incentives is smaller than 
their effect on real R&D investment, but it is still sizeable. The elasticity of the R&D wage with respect to 
the fraction of the wage supported by the WBSO scheme is estimated at 0.1.  
 
Key words: price effect of tax incentives; tax credits; panel data model; R&D wages 
JEL Codes: O32, O38, H25, J30, C23 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, UNU-
MERIT 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried out at the 
Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement: The analysis for this paper was in part performed within the project “Evaluation of 
WBSO: Effects, coverage and execution”, commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the 
Netherlands. The authors would like to thank the members of the feedback group for their critical remarks. 
This paper represents the personal views of the authors, not necessarily those of the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The authors also wish to thank Bronwyn Hall and Jacques Mairesse for their critical 
comments. 
 4 
 5 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Economists keep challenging the usefulness of R&D tax incentive programs. They raise two 
objections: government supported R&D may crowd out private R&D funding or get dissipated in 
higher R&D wages instead of stimulating real R&D spending. Many empirical studies have 
examined the first question and concluded that there is some additionality, in the sense that firms 
increase their R&D spending by more than the money they get from government in support of 
R&D (see Hall, 2002 and Arundel et al., 2008) for reviews of empirical studies). Few empirical 
studies have looked into the price effect as opposed to the volume effect of R&D tax incentives. 
The evaluation of the magnitude of this price effect is the objective of this paper. 
 
The inelastic supply of R&D workers, which increases their leverage in negotiated wage 
settlements, suggests that the wage effect of government R&D support can be substantial.  
Goolsbee (1998) has shown that similar to the price effects for physical goods, these R&D wage 
effects are sizable1. Using Current Population Survey data he estimates that a 10% increase in 
total federal R&D expenditure leads to a 3% increase in wages of R&D workers in the US. Low 
user cost elasticities and inelastic labor supply of R&D workers in the short run can therefore put 
limits on the efficacy of government intervention to stimulate private R&D.2  
 
Few studies have attempted to quantify the effect of R&D tax incentives on R&D  wages, in 
part because of the heavy data requirements for such an exercise. Marey and Borghans 
(2000) attempt to quantify a wage effect of R&D tax incentives by applying a co-
integration analysis using sectoral data from the Netherlands. They report an average 
estimate of the elasticity of R&D wages with respect to total R&D expenditures of 0.52 in 
the short run and 0.38 in the long run.  Haegeland and Møen (2007) estimate on Norvegian 
data that per Euro of tax credit 33 Eurocent go into higher average wages for R&D 
personnel. The wage effect is especially characteristic for SMEs. 
                                                 
 
1
 Goolsbee (1997) argues that the low price elasticities of physical investment that are often found in 
empirical research can be explained by the fact that the short-run increased investment induced by tax 
incentives are mainly due to higher prices of the capital goods rather than to increases in the quantity of 
investment. According to his estimates a 10% investment tax credit can increase equipment price by as much 
as 3.5% – 7% in the short run. 
 
2
 See Romer (2000) for an elaboration on this point. 
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In this paper we revisit the R&D wage effect of R&D tax credits using two different models 
applied to Dutch firm data. In one model we compare the elasticities of real and nominal R&D 
labor using a dynamic factor demand model and firm specific user costs of R&D. The other 
model is borrowed from the stream of literature in labor economics that argues that wages are at 
least partly determined by sharing in the rents generated by efficiency wages, the employer’s 
ability to pay, features of the product market, trade liberalization and technological innovations 
(Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Krueger and Summers, 
1988; van Reenen, 1996). We argue that similar to sharing in rents, employers can share in R&D 
tax credits with scientists, engineers and the supporting personnel operating in R&D units, 
resulting in a price effect of R&D tax incentives.  
 
In our empirical analysis we use an unbalanced firm-level panel dataset constructed from the 
annual R&D surveys, and production statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the 
Netherlands. The richness of the merged dataset allows us to construct detailed R&D user costs 
as a function of R&D tax incentives, providing sufficient variation in both the cross-section and 
time dimensions to identify the effects of the tax incentive program on R&D wages.  
 
Our main empirical finding is that there is a significant price effect of the Dutch R&D tax 
incentive program. Random and fixed-effects instrumental variable models in which unobserved 
firm effects, industry effects, and business cycles fluctuations are controlled for and the 
endogeneity of the R&D tax credits is taken into account produce a tight range of estimates of the 
elasticity of R&D wages with respect to the tax disbursements, between 0.09 and 0.11 in the 
short run and 0.11 and 0.12 in the long run. Both are statistically and economically significant. 
Our estimates indicate that for each Euro that government spends in stimulating R&D as much as 
12 Eurocents in the short run and 8 Eurocents in the long run may go into R&D wages.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some initial evidence of the 
presence of a wage effect and then goes on to propose a theoretical model to relate wages to the 
R&D tax incentives. Section 3 lays out our empirical modeling approach, describes the way we 
assembled our data set and explains how we constructed the variables used in the empirical 
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analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical results and discusses several alternative regression 
specifications and sensitivity checks. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
In 1994 the Dutch Government introduced the tax incentives scheme for the promotion of private 
R&D known under the acronym of WBSO, standing for The Wage tax and Social Insurance Act 
(Wet bevordering speur - en ontwikkelingswerk) 3. Firms can apply for the wage tax deductions 
based on their annual R&D wage bill. The scheme is quite known and widely used by Dutch 
firms. In 2005 alone the Dutch government spent about 400 million Euros on WBSO. Anecdotal 
evidence collected via interviews with the firms’ R&D managers suggests that especially large 
firms encourage their R&D managers to apply for WBSO support complementary to the firm’s 
regular R&D program4.  
 
In order to get a feeling of a possible effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentives on R&D wages 
besides R&D quantity, we start from the dynamic factor demand model for R&D from Lokshin 
and Mohnen (2007), replacing real R&D by nominal R&D. In the absence of a price effect, the 
elasticities of real and nominal R&D to variations in the user cost of R&D generated by changes 
in R&D tax incentives should be the same. Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) estimated the following 
demand equation for R&D:  
 
ittit
it
it
it
it vtu
K
R
K
R
+++=
−
−
−
σγ
2
1
1
         (1) 
 
where itR  is the 
thi  firm’s (real) R&D expenditure at period t, 1, −tiK the beginning of period R&D 
stock and itu  the firm’s user cost of R&D in period t .  
                                                 
        
3
 An overview of the WBSO parameters for all the years we use to estimate the model is given in Table 
2. In 2004, there were two brackets with the corresponding rates of 42% on the first 110 thousand Euros in 
firm R&D wage expenditures, followed by 14% on the remaining amount below the ceiling, set at 7.9 million 
Euros of tax credits.  
 
4
 These interviews with companies’ R&D managers were conducted within a broader assessment project 
of the effectiveness of WBSO; their outcomes are reported in Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2007.  
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If R&D flow is expressed in nominal terms, the numerator of the dependent variable in (1) can be 
written as a product of the R&D wage rate (price) w , and the R&D labor (quantity) L , divided 
by the R&D labor share in total R&D  Ls . We can reasonably assume that the labor share in total 
R&D is approximately constant over time. The effect of R&D tax incentives, via changes in the 
user cost of R&D, on nominal R&D can hence be decomposed into a price effect and a quantity 
effect.  
 
We obtain a nominal short-run elasticity of -0.35 and a nominal long-run elasticity of -0.76, both 
statistically significant. By comparing these nominal effects with the estimated real effects (short 
run elasticity of -0.28 and long-run elasticity of -0.72), reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007, 
Table 4, column 5), we arrive at a price effect of changes in the user cost of R&D of 
approximately 20% in the short run and 7% in the long run.  
 
This exercise suggests that there is a non-negligible price effect created by the Dutch R&D tax 
incentives provision. Our hypothesis is that the price effect arises as a result of firms and R&D 
workers sharing in the R&D tax credits received from the government. There are various ways to 
justify this tax credit sharing. Firms may use it as an incentive for their R&D workers to apply for 
R&D tax credits. It may reflect imperfections in the labor market for scientists and engineers, 
inelastic supply resulting in wage increases, search costs or bargaining power on the labor supply 
side.  The point here is not that firms reduce their own R&D effort by government money 
(crowding out) but that additional R&D expenditures are split in quantity and price effects. To 
test this hypothesis, we start from an efficient bargaining model, in which the wage of R&D 
workers is partly determined by sharing in the R&D tax credits. Essentially we want to test the 
magnitude of the sharing parameter.  
 
To assess whether there is a price effect of R&D tax credits, we follow the previous studies and 
apply a Nash asymmetric bargaining model5. Assuming risk-neutral preferences on the part of the 
                                                 
 
5
 A bargaining or rent-sharing approach to wage determination is widely used in the empirical labor 
literature (e.g., Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al., 1986; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; van 
Reenen, 1996; Veugelers, 1989). 
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employees, an expression for the real wage w of R&D workers in firm i results from maximizing 
the following bargaining problem: 
 
 
 
[ ]{ } ),(log)1()()(logmax
,
LwdLwuwu
Lw
ββθ −+−= ,      (2) 
 
where  )(wu  is the R&D worker’s utility from wage w , w  is an alternative wage that can be 
earned in case bargaining breaks down,  L  is R&D employment (which could also be interpreted 
as a probability of employment), and d  is the R&D tax credit disbursement.  Parameter β  
( 10 ≤≤ β ) is the sharing parameter. It measures the fraction of the R&D tax credits that accrues 
to R&D workers in addition to their opportunity wage. The situation when 0=β represents the 
case when the entire disbursement accrues to the firm and the R&D tax incentive program has no 
effect on R&D wages.  On the other hand, a situation when 0>β means that tax credit 
disbursement leads to increased R&D wages6.  
 
Solving the first-order condition of problem (2) with respect to wages gives the following 
‘structural’ equation7:  
 
 
])/[()/()1( wLdwLdww −+=+−≅ βββ  .      (3) 
 
 
                                                 
6
 If 1=β the R&D worker would choose to set the wage rate equal to Ld / , assuming the latter to be higher than the 
alternative wage. 
 
7
 Expression (4) directly relates R&D wages to the excess of tax credit disbursements over the 
opportunity wage. In the labor economics literature the tax credit disbursements are replaced by rents. 
Different measures of rents have been considered, such as profits per employee (Arai, 2003; Blanchflower et 
al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997), value added per employee (Dobbelaere, 2004), and Tobin Q 
(Salinger, 1984; Van Reenen, 1996).  Parameter β , as explained, represents the bargaining power of 
workers. It can be considered as a constant to be estimated, but it can also be made heterogeneous and 
modeled to depend on variables such as sectoral unemployment rates, price index, proxies for product market 
concentration (e.g., Dobbelaere, 2004; Veugelers, 1989). Van Reenen (1996) estimates rents as a function of 
firms’ innovation output and R&D input.  
  
 10 
We are interested in finding out the extent of the sharing of the tax credit disbursement between 
firms and R&D workers. The percentage of the R&D wage that is reduced because of the tax 
credit scheme ( Rd ) is a sufficient statistic for the measure of disbursement, which as explained in 
Lokshin and Mohnen (2007), looks as follows in the case of the Dutch WBSO tax incentive 
scheme, ignoring for the sake of clarity the firm and time subscripts: 
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where Ls is the percentage of labor costs in total R&D, R ;  212211 )1( DDa ωω +−= , 
2
2
22
2
1 )1( DDb ωω +−= , baRRc LL /)( 12 −= , 11 =D  if the firm  uses the WBSO credit facility, else 
01 =D ; 12 =D if the firm is eligible for a starter’s rate8, else 02 =D and 1=e  if 1LL RRs > , else 
0=e . The last inequality determines whether a firm’s total R&D wage bill ( RsL ) exceeds the 
length of the first bracket, 1LR . If the amount of R&D labor falls below level 1LR , the first bracket 
rate can be used, above that level the second rate is applicable up to a total permissible deduction 
of  2LR . In case of start-up firms, the first bracket rate is a bit more generous.  
 
The parameters that enter (4), i.e., R , Ls , 1D  and 2D , are all firm-specific and time varying but 
the corresponding indexes are omitted for tractability. The values of 11ω (first bracket tax rate for 
non-starters), 12ω (first bracket tax rate for firms that are classified as starters), 21ω (second bracket 
tax rate for firms that are non-starters), 22ω (second bracket tax rate for starters), 1LR  (length of the 
first bracket ceiling expressed in terms of deductible R&D labor costs), 2LR  (ceiling in WBSO 
disbursements,  for example, in 2001, 1LR Rp  amounted to 90.756 €) are given in Table 2.9 
                                                 
 
8
 If a firm satisfies two criteria, to be younger than 5 years and have participated in the WBSO program 
no more than three times, it can use a higher first-bracket R&D tax rate (for example in 2004, 60% instead of 
40% for non-starters). These criteria are checked by SenterNovem, an administrative agency in charge of the 
tax incentives, at the time of application.  
 
9
 We cannot take the provision for starters in (4) into account because therefore we would need data 
from SenterNovem, but as indicated in Ministry of Economic Affairs (2007), the number of starters is 
limited. 
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Expression (4) determines the rate at which an R&D-performing firm can reduce its R&D labor 
costs by using the R&D tax incentives. We can use it to compute the amount of WBSO 
disbursement, in Euros, which a firm receives back from SenterNovem, the administrative agency 
in charge of R&D tax incentives. The agency’s decisions are taken to be completely exogenous in 
our model, as they are in practice10. The WBSO disbursement per R&D worker in firm i is 
nothing but (4) times the average R&D wage rate. 
 
 
3. Econometric model, data and descriptive statistics 
 
A. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
The theoretical discussion in the previous section suggests the following reduced-form equation 
for wages:  
 
( )wdfW R ,,β=   0>∂∂ Rdf , 0>∂∂ wf , 10 ≤≤ β ,               (5) 
     
where dR is a measure of R&D tax credit, w  is the alternative wage and β  is the sharing 
parameter to be estimated.  
 
In rent-sharing models of wage determination the equilibrium wage is determined by internal as 
well as external factors. The latter can be thought of as opportunity costs or the going wage in 
other sectors of the economy (e.g., Blanchflower, Oswalf and Sanfey, 1996; van Reenen, 1996). 
The importance of controlling for the alternative wage depends on the extent to which the skills 
of R&D workers are firm or industry specific, i.e. substitutability of R&D skills within or across 
industries. It could be set to zero, an approach taken by Vandenbussche et al. (2001). Ideally, it 
should reflect the marginal productivity of labor (MPL) prevailing in each industry. MPL is 
difficult to measure in practice and we therefore follow the example of van Reenen (1996) and 
                                                 
 
10
 The principle function of SenterNovem is to process administration related to WBSO applications and 
to verify that the R&D projects submitted for approval conform to the regulations set for this R&D support 
scheme.  
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include average sector R&D wage as a proxy for alternative wage. Alternatively, we could 
interpret our results as a premium over the industry wage determined by an inelastic R&D labor 
supply curve.  
 
Previous contributions found that wages are positively correlated with firm size, firm profits and 
capital intensity. A positive effect of profits on wages can arise as a result of the rent-sharing at 
the firm level and collective wage bargaining at the industry level (Blanchflower et al., 1996; 
Forslund, 1994; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991). Abowd, Kramarz 
and Margolis (1999) using a large employer-employee French panel dataset find that firms that 
pay higher wages are more capital intensive, productive and profitable. Arai (2003) using a 
matched employer-employee data from Sweden finds a significant positive effect of average 
firm’s profits and its capital-labor ratio on wages after controlling for worker individual 
characteristics. Given equal union status, several authors have found that there is a wage 
premium for workers employed by large firms. Large firms can enjoy more market power and be 
more successful in attracting higher-quality workers (Albaek et al., 1998; Melow, 1982; Brown 
and Medoff, 1989).   
 
Based on these findings in the literature, we specify the following estimating equation:   
 
 
+++++= jtititititRit wbRDbSizebLKbdbW lnintln)/(lnln 5432,1 itjtZ ε+d          (6)                                            
 
                    
Because most of the heterogeneity in wages is likely to come from firm and sectoral differences 
and not from variations in the time dimension, we use several random as well as fixed effects 
methods to estimate equation (6) with unobservable industry-specific and firm-specific effects.  
 
To allow for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity in wages across industries and firms within 
industries and an impact of common macro-economic shocks, the error term itε  in equation (6) 
includes industry specific effects jν , a (nested) effect iµ  of the i-th firm in the j-th industry, and 
a year-specific intercept tλ , in addition to serially uncorrelated measurement errors itu : 
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The dependent variable in equation (6) Wln is the logarithm of the real R&D wage rate. To 
construct it we divide the total real R&D labor costs by total firm R&D employment (cf. Hildreth 
and Oswald, 1997). Both the total wage bill and the number of R&D employees are taken from 
the R&D survey database. Wages are expressed in real terms, i.e. R&D variables are deflated by 
a weighted average composed for 50% of the GDP deflator and for 50% of the R&D wage 
deflator. A similar approach is taken by Bloom et al. (2002.). 
 
We include K/L, the capital-to-labor ratio, as a control variable. There are several reasons for 
doing so. According to Bronars and Famulari (2001) complementarity between capital and 
skilled labor will lead capital intensive firms to hiring more skilled workers (with a higher 
productivity of labor). Second, the higher capital-to-labor ratio is expected to increase the the 
workers’ bargaining power and therefore to positively affect their wage rate. When labor costs 
are negligible vis-à-vis the cost of capital, employers’ resistance to wage demand is expected to 
be smaller (Arai, 2003).  According to the efficiency wage theory, a higher capital-labor ratio can 
also lead to an increase in the cost of production and prompt firms to accord a wage premium to 
their employees in order to decrease these costs and improve performance (e.g., Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986).  
 
RDint is R&D intensity, measured as the firm’s real R&D expenditures divided by total sales. 
Controlling for the R&D intensity at the firm level is likely to be important considering the 
possibility of high-ability and consequently high-wage workers systematically “sorting” out into 
more R&D intensive firms. Previous empirical studies report significant differences in the ability 
of specific groups of workers to command higher wages (e.g., Black and Strahan, 2001; Nekby, 
2003). R&D intensity and wages could be correlated if scientists and engineers and the 
supporting personnel operating in R&D units constitute a relatively important group within a 
firm. According to Sap (1993) the relative importance of a group can under certain conditions 
determine the bargaining power of this group. A higher R&D intensity ratio captures to some 
extent the importance of R&D workers within a firm.  
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To control for firm size we include lnSize, the logarithm of the firm’s number of employees. 
Brown and Medoff (1989) offer several explanations rooted in ‘compensating differentials’ as 
well as institutional theory for the positive correlation between firm size and wage premium. 
These factors capture the desire of larger employers to ‘follow a strategy of positive labor 
relations’ as well as their advantage over smaller rivals in attracting higher labor quality.  
 
We further include controls for business cycle influences on R&D investment by using industry-
specific business cycle indicators: for investment potential (i.e. solvability and return on total 
assets) and indicators for perceived competition, turbulence and economic development. These 
business-cycle variables at the industry level are collected in vector Z in expression (6). Many 
studies have uncovered cyclicality of wages over the business cycle (see Abraham and 
Haltiwanger, 1995, for a review; Bils, 1985; Kean et al., 1988; Solon et al., 1994). Cyclical wage 
movements can be the result of technology shocks shifting short-run demand curves against fixed 
supply curves or of the movements along a fixed short-run labor demand curve. Bowlus et al., 
(2002) point out that this cyclical behavior of wages may be difficult to capture with aggregated 
data because of the potential compositional changes in a firm’s labor force over the business 
cycle. In our case, such compositional changes are likely to be limited because we look at a 
specific narrow subset of firm’s labor force. In the short run a firm may change relative skill 
composition of its R&D employees by, for example, attracting more senior research staff as 
opposed to research assistants. We control for this by including a ratio of researchers to research 
assistants.  
 
We use expression (4), to compute dR, using information about the R&D cost composition 
provided by CBS and the parameters of the WBSO scheme taken from Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (2007). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimation. 
Table 2 provides details on the parameters of the R&D tax incentive scheme. A positive 
relationship is expected between the R&D tax credit disbursements and the wage rate, if there is a 
price effect of the tax incentives program.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
Before concluding this section, we want to indicate two potential sources of bias in our 
specification. The average wage rate on the left-hand side of (6) is a result of aggregating the 
individual wage rates over all R&D employees within a firm, i.e.  ( )∑∑= i iti ititat hhwW lnln . We 
do not have data on the individual worker wages and relying on aggregated firm data does not 
allow us to control for differences in R&D workers’ characteristics such as seniority and 
schooling. As opposed to other studies that estimated a wage equation at the firm or industry 
level (e.g. Forslund, 1994; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997) we look at the more homogenous subset 
of R&D employees. As a result of the aggregation we estimate an average R&D wage effect of 
R&D tax incentives. The aggregation bias is mitigated if R&D incentives affect all R&D workers 
of a firm, which is the case for the WBSO provision. 
 
The construction of R&D tax credit disbursements using equation (4) is another potential cause 
of bias. The amount of R&D tax credit disbursements depends partially on the wage rate of R&D 
workers. This partial endogeneity of the disbursement measure is likely to bias downwards the 
coefficient of R&D tax credit disbursement in equation (6). We will use instrumental variable 
techniques, explained in a later section, to try to alleviate the endogeneity problem.  Inability to 
control for individual worker characteristics amounts to an omitted variables bias (see Abowd et 
al., 1999, for discussion).  
 
 
B. DATA SAMPLE 
 
The empirical analysis makes use of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics’ annual R&D surveys 
in combination with production statistics. The R&D surveys contain information on the type and 
the amount of R&D expenditures and the census data contain information on output and labor, as 
well as output deflators. We merge the two data sources using a unique firm identification 
number. These data sources and the process of merging them are explained in detail in Ministry 
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of Economic Affairs (2007). In the estimation we use an unbalanced panel of yearly firm 
observations between 1996 and 2004.  
 
In this study we estimate a price effect for a small subset of all employees. The average number 
of R&D workers per firm is about 20 in our sample. If we take into account only full-time 
researchers (and omitting research assistants) the mean is about 10 employees. In percentage 
terms R&D workers make up on average in our sample 7.8% of total employment per firm (3.8% 
if we exclude research assistants). About 70% of firms in the sample have at most 10 R&D 
employees. If we count only full-time researchers this share becomes 85%.  On average, across 
the years, the sectoral real R&D wage rate grew at 3.7% per annum, from an average of a little 
over 20 Euro/hour in 1997 to about 26 Euro/hour. The average annual inflation rate was about 
2.5%. The standard average deviation of the average wage is about 3. It actually decreased over 
time in our sample, mainly because the sample composition tilted towards larger firms. The 
cross-sectional variation of the average firm wage within sectors is large (average standard 
deviation of about 10) and accounts for most of the heterogeneity in wages.  
 
The measurement of R&D tax credit disbursement is a crucial part of this paper. For each firm 
and each year available in the sample we compute the R&D tax credit rate that a firm can benefit 
from. Not all firms, however, apply for this R&D tax credit, but this information is not available 
in our dataset. We assume that all potential users of the tax credits are actual users. Since our 
sample is biased towards large firms, we expect the tax credit effect on wages to be 
overestimated. We may attribute high wages to tax credits when actually no tax credits are 
claimed. However, we expect this bias to be small.11 The R&D tax incentive facility primarily 
targets small and medium sized enterprises. Among some 10200 firms that applied for WBSO in 
2004, 46% had fewer than 10 employees, while the share of firms with 10-50 employees was 
32% and the shares of medium-sized firms (50-250 employees) and large firms (250 and more 
employees) were 16% and 5% respectively.  The share of the smallest firms, those with fewer 
than 10 employees, has grown from 1995 to 2004 from 30% to 46%. The shares of all other size 
                                                 
 
11
 We assume in our model that each firm eligible for WBSO makes use of it. To know which firms do 
not claim any tax credits, we would need the information from SenterNovem. In Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (2007) we estimate that about 90 percent of the firms with full time R&D workers (persistent R&D 
performers) are WBSO users.  
 17 
classes have declined in the same period: for the size class 10-50 employees from 37% to 32%; 
for that of 5-249 employees from 24% to 16%, and for that of more than 250 employees from 9% 
to 5%. Enterprises from all manufacturing and service sectors can apply for WBSO. In 2004 there 
was the following distribution of WBSO users by sector: agriculture (7%), food (5%), chemicals 
(11%), machines (29%), other manufacturing (22%), ICT (11%), and other services (14%).  This 
distribution has stayed more or less constant from 1996 till 2004 (see Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 2007). 
 
For all size classes the coverage has gradually increased from the inception of the tax incentives 
program in 1994 to 2004, both in terms of the number of firms applying and the number of total 
applications by these firms. From 1997 to 2004 there was a 29% increase in granted applications 
for the tax credits. 
 
When we split the number of observations in our sample in three categories of firm size we see 
that the distribution of our sample across size classes remains stable over time12. The middle size 
group (50 to 250 employees) represents around 59%. Largest firms (over 250 employees) are 
over-represented in our sample. The smallest size group (fewer than 10 employees) is under-
represented due to the absence of innovation and R&D survey data from CBS over the whole 
period for firms with less than 10 employees. According to SenterNovem, 70% of the WBSO 
receivers are firms with less than 250 employees. In our final sample the number of observations 
from firms in that size class is close to 60% of the total. In the end, our dataset covers only a 
fraction of the total population of WBSO receivers: on average, across years, firms in our sample 
account for 15% of total WBSO expenditures and almost 25% of all R&D performed in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Table 2 lists the main parameters of the WBSO program for the period covered by our estimation 
sample. The WBSO budget has increased by almost 80%, and the number of approved for 
funding projects has grown by almost 60% from 1996 to 2004. 
 
                                                 
 
12
 We selected only those firms that perform R&D on a continuous basis, the so called ‘hard-core’ R&D 
performers because in odd years CBS only collects data for ‘hard-core’ R&D performers.  
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In the empirical analysis the following industries are used with their standard industrial 
classification code (SBI) in parentheses: food, beverages and tobacco (15-16), textile, apparel and 
leather (17-19), Paper and paper products (21), printing (22), Oil (23), chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (24), rubber products and plastics (25), non-metallic products (26), Basic metals 
(27), fabricated metal products (28), machines and equipment (29), electrical products (30-33), 
motor vehicles (34-35), other manufacturing (36-37), construction (45), catering (50), 
wholesalers (50), retailers (52), communication (60-64), and business services (70-74).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results of Equation (6) with both random and fixed firm and industry effects.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 
As a benchmark case, in column (1) we report the results from a panel regression with firm-
specific random effects in which the R&D tax credit disbursement variable is treated as 
exogenous. The individual effects are significantly different from zero. The Hausman test rejects 
the null that the R&D tax credit disbursement is exogenous ( )1(2χ  is 6.67) and, therefore, 
instrumental variable techniques are required. We estimate the generalized two-stage least 
squares model with individual effects. We apply the Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar 
version of the estimator, which uses the exogenous variables as instruments after they have been 
passed through the feasible GLS transform because of the error component structure (Baltagi, 
2005).  In equation (6) estimated in levels (results listed in columns 1-4) we instrument the level 
of disbursement with the first-difference in disbursement, output and the share of R&D workers 
in a firms’ total employment. We exploit as orthogonality conditions only the stationarity of the 
series, in other words the orthogonality between the levels of the error terms and the differences 
in the instruments.  
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We use a Sargan test to check the validity of our instruments. The Sargan test statistic is small 
(0.96, p-value 0.61) and therefore we cannot reject the validity of the instruments. Furthermore, 
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic (429.05, 10% critical value is 22.30) rejects the null of weak 
instruments.  We also checked whether capital-to-labor ratio and R&D intensity variables are 
endogenous and need to be instrumented. The obtained C-statistic (2.71, p-value 0.26) is quite 
small and therefore we cannot reject the null of exogeneity of both of these variables. We find 
that the elasticity of tax credit disbursement increases slightly from 0.07 to 0.09 after 
instrumenting the R&D tax credit disbursements. The coefficients on capital-to-labor ratio, firm 
size and alternative wage do not change much and remain statistically significant in the 
generalized two-stage least squares model  
 
In columns (3)-(5) we report the results from alternative specifications regarding the firm and 
industry effects (fixed or random).  When we use fixed industry effects (these results are listed in 
column 3) by including industry dummies as regressors in addition to random firm effects 
(Column 2) the fit of the model increases slightly (the Akaike information criterion drops from -
2.8 to -2.84) and the joint F-test on the industry dummies rejects the null that their coefficients 
are jointly zero. The coefficients on the firm-specific variables (disbursement, size, capital-labor 
ratio, and R&D intensity) remain practically unchanged compared to the model with firm random 
effects only. The industry-level variable, alternative wage, becomes statistically insignificant.  
 
In column (4) we report the results when both firm and industry effects are random. In this model 
the firm-specific effects are nested random (of the j-th firm within i-th industry) in the random 
industry-specific effects. The industry individual effect is much larger than the firm effect, and 
both random effects are statistically significant uiσ =0.07 (standard error 0.01) and ujσ =0.17 
(standard error 0.01). The coefficients of the explanatory variables do not change much compared 
to the previous column.   
 
Finally, in column (5) we report the results from the ‘fixed-effects’ model. The inclusion of firm 
and industry fixed effects implies that any variation in the disbursement variable now comes 
entirely from within-firm differences across time.  We estimate the model in first-differences (by 
first differencing equation (6) in two consecutive periods). Through differencing we eliminate the 
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fixed effects, i.e. unobserved time-invariant variables at the worker, firm and industry level. We 
instrument for the disbursement variable in first-differences with the lagged levels in 
disbursement, output and the share of R&D workers in total firm’s employment. Here we exploit 
the orthogonality between the differences in the residuals and the levels of the instruments. The 
elasticity of disbursement increases slightly to 0.12 compared to the random-effects models. The 
elasticity of the R&D wage with respect to the alternative wage is now significant at the 10% 
level compared to the random-random model.   
 
Both capital-to-labor ratio and firm size are very significant in all versions of the model, 
suggesting that R&D wages are higher in larger and more capital-intensive firms. The coefficient 
on the R&D intensity measure on the other hand, is never significant, suggesting that more R&D 
intensive firms do not necessarily pay higher wages to their R&D workers compared to less R&D 
intensive firms13.  When we include quadratic terms of capital-to-labor ratio and firm size, we 
find a concave relationship between wages and these two variables, although the quadratic term 
of size is only weakly significant.  
 
Several other experiments were carried out to check the robustness of the findings. To check for 
interaction effects we also included the interactions terms of capital-to-labor ratio and size and 
R&D intensity and size in addition to the simple terms and other controls. The coefficient on the 
former interaction term was negative and significant both in the random and first-differenced 
models, albeit very small in absolute value, suggesting that there is a negative R&D wage 
premium in the largest and most capital intensive firms. The coefficient on the latter cross-term 
was not significant, while the other coefficients hardly changed. To check for the effect of 
potential compositional changes in a firm’s labor force over the business cycle, such as its skill 
composition, we included as an additional control variable the ratio of senior research staff over 
total R&D employees. This variable was not found to be significant in any of the specifications.  
 
The alternative wage variable is significant in the random-effects models, and is not, as expected, 
when industry-fixed effects are added to the model. It is significant at the 10% level with a much 
                                                 
 
13
 We also estimated a version of the model taking the logarithms of capital-to-labor ratio and R&D 
intensity. This change did not affect the estimate of disbursements.  
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smaller coefficient in the version of the model estimated in first-differences (column 5). Some of 
the business-cycle control variables were found significant in models with time dummies after 
controlling for firm and industry effects. The ratio of new entrants and exits/spin-offs is negative 
and significant in the random effects model and the index of perceived competition in the first-
differenced models. These two outcomes are hardly surprising, suggesting that a relatively high 
exit rate in a sector and higher competition depress R&D wages.  The joint test of significance of 
these business cycle variables is 13.16 in the random effects model (column 3) rejecting the null 
and 7.19 in the differenced model (column 5) failing to reject the null.  
 
The theoretical model (2) is essentially static. Several previous studies estimated a dynamic 
version of (6) justifying this persistence by, for example, the slow adjustment of wages to 
external shocks (e.g., Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). We have re-estimated our equation (6) by 
including lagged terms for the wage and the disbursement terms. We have used a one-step 
difference and efficient system GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
estimators. The results from these dynamic models are presented in Table 4. We use the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables (i.e. lagged wage rate and disbursement) in addition to 
exogenous variables as instruments. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not 
reject the validity of the instruments (56.52, p-value 0.28 for system GMM and 38.4, p-value 
0.36 for difference GMM). Arellano-Bond AR tests indicate no autocorrelation in the first 
differences of the residuals. The estimated coefficient on the lagged wage variable is 0.21 
(standard error of 0.03) in the system GMM and 0.16 (standard error 0.04) in the difference 
GMM models, suggesting quick adjustment in wages. The coefficient on the disbursement 
variable is 0.10 (standard error of 0.03) in the difference GMM and 0.11 (standard error of 0.03) 
in the one-step system GMM. These values imply a long-run elasticity of wages with respect to 
disbursement of 0.12 – 0.13, that is statistically significant. Higher order lags for disbursement 
were not found to be significant.  
 
It is worth mentioning that our results of the price effect of R&D tax incentives are consistent 
with the findings reported in the labor literature of wage determination. Hildreth and Oswald 
(1997) estimated an elasticity of wages with respect to profits per worker of about 4% using firm-
level data. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) report an elasticity of about 20%. Van Reenen (1997) 
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applied three different measures of rents (profits per head, Tobin Q and the difference between 
real sales per worker and average industry wage), created through product innovation, to examine 
the impact of innovation induced rents on wages using a panel of British firms. He reports an 
elasticity of wages to innovation rents of about 0.29 for the quasi-rent measure, 0.05 for the 
profits per head measure and 0.04 for Tobin’s Q rent measure.  Blanchflower et al. (1996) 
estimate an elasticity of wages with respect to profit per employee of 0.08 using U.S data. Studies 
that used matched worker-firm data typically found smaller rent-sharing effect. For example, 
Arai (2003) reports an elasticity of about 2% for Swedish data after controlling for fixed effects 
and instrumenting profits. Martins (2006) finds an elasticity of wage with respect to profits per 
employee in the range of 0.09 – 0.18 with Portuguese data. The recent exception is Kramarz 
(2007) who reports a bargaining power parameter of 0.5 for the French data.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the price effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentive program known as WBSO. 
This program is intended to stimulate R&D, with special provisions for small firms and startups, 
by granting firms deductions from their social security contributions in proportion to their annual 
R&D wage bill. A recent evaluation of the WBSO program (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2007) 
and an earlier study of ours as part of this evaluation (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2007) concluded that 
it was effective in stimulating business R&D, at least in the short run. Here we find evidence that 
there is also a wage effect of the R&D tax incentives program. Part of the R&D tax credits get 
transmitted into higher R&D wages because of inelastic labor supply, search costs for scientists 
and engineers, incentives given to R&D employees or bargaining power of R&D employees.  
 
To estimate the magnitude of the price elasticity we have used a symmetric Nash bargaining 
model borrowed from the literature on labor economics and we have constructed firm- and time-
specific R&D tax credit rates. Using a rich unbalanced firm-level panel data covering the years 
1996-2004 we have estimated random and fixed-effects instrumental variable models in which 
 23 
we have controlled for unobserved firm and industry effects, business cycles fluctuations as well 
as the endogeneity of the R&D disbursement measures.  We obtain a tight range of estimated 
elasticities of wages with respect to the R&D tax credit disbursement of the order of 10% in the 
short run and 12% in the long run. 
 
Our estimates are smaller than those found for total government R&D by Goolsbee (1998) and 
those in Marey and Borghans (2000) for total sectoral R&D. Three factors could explain the 
differences between our estimates and theirs. First, ours concern only indirect tax incentives and 
not total government R&D or total private and public R&D, which firms may find easier to 
obtain and be more inclined to share with their R&D workers. Second, these authors use 
aggregate R&D data and hence their price effect could contain spillover effects. Third, they use 
time-series whereas we use panel data. Our estimates are thus likely to be less contaminated by 
trend factors.   
 
The existence of a wage effect of R&D tax credits suggests that the efficiency of the R&D tax 
incentive program could be enhanced if the wage effect could be avoided. What goes into higher 
wages for scientists and engineers could go into more real expenditures on research and 
development. 
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Table  1 Variable constructions and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Construction Mean Standard 
Deviation  
 
Variables at the firm level 
Wage rate Total wage bill divided by the number of 
hours, in logarithm 
 3.02 0.27 
Capital-labor ratio Capital stock divided by the number of 
employees (in 1000 Euros per employee) 
 12.75 18.72 
R&D intensity Total own firm’s R&D expenditures 
divided by sales 
 0.05 0.32 
Firm size Number of employees in logarithm  4.95 1.04 
Disbursements 
measure 
WBSO rate, computed as in (4), in logs -1.86 0.49 
 
Variables at the industry level 
Alternative wage Average sectoral R&D wage rate, in 
logarithm 
 3.14 0.13 
Investment potential: 
solvability  
Average solvability at industry level 36.10 11.13 
Investment potential: 
return  
Average return on total assets at industry 
level 
2.68 7.31 
Perceived 
competition  
Index scaled between 0 (perceived 
competition is very low) and 100 (very 
high. Mean perception of competition of 
entrepreneurs at industry level   
45.60 2.08 
Turbulence  Ratio of new entrants and exits and spin-
offs  at industry level 
11.64 3.21 
Turnover  Annual mutation of added value at 
industry level 
6.47 3.75 
Note: The descriptive statistics are sample means for the years 1996-2004. The industry level data other than the 
alternative wage were provided to us by EIM. 
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Table 2 Overview of WBSO program parameters 
 
Year WBSO 
budget 
(in mln. 
Euro) 
Length of 
the first 
bracket  (in 
Euro of 
R&D) 
Tax credit 
rate in first  
bracket (in 
%) 
Tax credit 
rate in 
second  
bracket (in 
%) 
Ceiling  
(in mln. 
Euro of tax 
credits) 
WBSO Tax 
credit on 
one Euro of 
labor R&D 
costs 
1997 227 68067 40 12.5 6.8 0.17 
1998 281 68067 40 17.5 6.8 0.19 
1999 293 68067 40 13 6.8 0.20 
2000 302 68067 40 13 6.8 0.21 
2001 337 90756 40 or 60 (s) 13 7.9 0.22 
2002 367 90756 40 or 70 (s) 13 7.9 0.20 
2003 323 90756 40 or 60 (s) 13 7.9 0.19 
2004 365 110000 40 or 60 (s) 14 7.9 0.19 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (2007); (s) stands for ‘starters’ 
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Table 3. Instrumental variable estimation of the wage equation (4), static model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 R&D tax 
credits treated 
as exogenous 
GMM, 
levels 
GMM, 
levels 
GMM, 
levels 
GMM, first 
differences 
Tax credit 
disbursements  
0.066*** 
(0.08) 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.088*** 
(0.013) 
0.086*** 
(0.013) 
0.124*** 
(0.014) 
Capital-labor ratio  
* 10-2 
0.141*** 
(0.220) 
0.141*** 
(0.022) 
0.149*** 
(0.023) 
0.146*** 
(0.022) 
0.491*** 
(0.036) 
R&D intensity  
* 10-2 
0.741 
(1.187) 
0.884 
(1.194) 
0.067 
(1.205) 
0.400 
(1.198) 
1.325 
(1.144) 
Size (in logs) 0.048*** 
(0.006) 
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
Alternative wage 0.187*** 
(0.049) 
0.188*** 
(0.049) 
0.032 
(0.061) 
0.082 
(0.058) 
0.081* 
(0.046) 
Standard error of 
firm specific effect 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.00) 
0.18*** 
(0.01) - 
Standard error of 
industry effect - - - 
0.07*** 
(0.01) - 
Business cycle 
control variables  
Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Firm effects Random Random Random Random Fixed 
Industry effects None None Fixed Random Fixed 
Sargan test of 
over-identifying 
restrictions (p-
value) 
 
- 
0.96 
(0.62) 
2.60 
(0.27) 
0.97 
(0.62) 
0.10 
(0.95) 
Number of firms 1286 1286 1286 1286 1286 
Number of 
observations 
3485 3485 3485 3485 3485 
Notes: Estimation period is 1996-2004. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. 
F-test of the joint significance of the industry dummies in column (3) is 219.19, which is significant. 
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Table 4 Estimation of a dynamic version of the wage equation (4) 
 
 (1) (2) 
 System GMM Difference GMM 
Wage rate
-1 0.212*** 
(0.034) 
0.164*** 
(0.043) 
Disbursements 0.097*** 
(0.024) 
0.112*** 
(0.028) 
Capital-labor ratio * 10-2 0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
R&D intensity * 10-2 0.006 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Size (in logs) 0.045*** 
(0.007) 
0.042 
(0.029) 
Alternative wage 0.199*** 
(0.049) 
0.083 
(0.060) 
Business cycle control variables  Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included 
   
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
(p-value) 
56.52 
(0.28) 
38.38 
(0.36) 
Number of firms 1286 798 
Number of observations 3485 2121 
Notes: Estimation period is 1996-2004. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level.  
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